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Abstract
The standard overlapping generations model is extended to include retradeable
paper assets (shares) of firms. Two period lived consumers hold portfolios includ-
ing paper assets and capital in order to transfer wealth over time. An infinitely
lived firm produces a stochastic output using a Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion with an additive shock. The random output is paid as dividends to shares
while factor prices receive their marginal products. Using the functional rational
expectations approach, the paper derives the dynamic MSV solution for i. i. d.
production shocks induced by the GAMMA distribution and for CARA utility
functions for consumers. It is shown that the resulting dynamics is one dimen-
sional, deterministic, and noncyclical. Multiple steady states may arise when the
capital share is more than one half and the risk adjusted return in the asset market
is high. In this case, an economy may suffer from a poverty trap which is purely
endogenously generated without requiring externalities or non convexities.
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1 Introduction
Economists seem to agree on the fact that the development of financial markets boosts
overall economic growth. There are few who argue that the existence of financial mar-
kets could fuel an inflationary pressure on equity and asset prices, thereby encouraging
a boom in consumption or unproductive investment with a negative effect on growth.
Liberalization of financial markets is always considered as being accompanied by in-
creasing opportunities for allocating risk where assets play a major role of transferring
wealth over time. Therefore, it is usually assumed that an active equity market pro-
vides new funds for productive purposes stimulating accumulation whenever firms issue
new equity in the market. In contrast, the role of a given equity market for the overall
performance of an economy has not been studied systematically.
A principle issue addressed in this paper is whether the availability of equity/paper assets
as a portfolio alternative to real capital could be an obstacle to growth. In other words,
is it possible that liberalization of financial markets may lead to a situation in which the
economy suffers from persistent underdevelopment, low capital stock, and consequently
low income. In a development context, it is commonly argued that the existence of
free market forces and the availability of equity capital in functioning financial markets
are the major factors for poor (low capital) economies to revive and catalyze their
convergence to the rich economies. The paper presents a dynamic model in which a
poverty trap for a low capital economy may arise when financial investment possibilities
(equity) are freely available, while this effect would not arise in the same economy
without a market for paper assets.
The literature has identified several causes why an economy may suffer from a poverty
trap (for a recent review see Matsuyama (2006)). Models explaining the reasons behind
the poverty trap, can be divided into two groups, so called threshold effect model and
externality type models. In threshold effect models, a poverty trap arises due to either
borrowing constraints or investment indivisibility. These frictions induce a critical level
in wealth, income, or other variables, which consumers cannot surpass once they are
below it (see for example Azariadis & Drazen (1990), Lee (1996), Ciccone & Kiminori
(1996)). In externality type models a poverty trap can arise either by increasing re-
turns to scale, other kinds of externalities, or market imperfections (see Stokey (1988),
Murphy, Shleifer & Vishny (1989), Matsuyama (2002)).
Among the threshold type models are those of Saint-Paul (1992), Zilibotti (1994), Ace-
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moglu & Zilibotti (1997), which describe an economy with capital accumulation and
financial markets. The authors argue that under-development of the financial market
can be a major reason behind limited opportunities to diversify risk. The major reasons
behind the existence of the poverty trap are 1) the inability to obtain external finance
due to the weak credit and 2) the risk aversion of investors who have no incentive to self-
finance a high return investment project due to its high risk inheritance. In Acemoglu
& Zilibotti (1997) there are no explicit costs of financial relations. However, risk averse
agents hold more of the safe assets initially due to investment indivisibility in highly
productive but risky investment. Eventually, with sufficient capital accumulation the
economy takes off and converges to its steady state where all the sectors are open and
risk is completely diversified. In Saint-Paul (1992) and Zilibotti (1994) one can ob-
tain non-convergence results in both levels and growth rates across countries which are
identical in technology and preferences. Saint-Paul (1992) introduces a strategic comple-
mentarity between financial markets and technology. Due to fixed cost, individuals may
be reluctant to open a financial market. Consequently, a transition to a faster growth
path with financial markets can happen at any time when income is between two critical
levels1. In other words, multiple equilibria can arise between these two critical values.
Financial intermediaries have to internalize the externality of the impact of individual
actions on technological choice to achieve a financial equilibrium. Similarly, in Zilibotti
(1994) economies endowed with capital below some threshold level might not attain self-
sustained growth with the first-best allocation. Each firm, when investing, adds to the
total demand of intermediation services and causes a fall in the wedge between the price
of internal and external capital. In a laissez-faire economy, firms ignore such external
effects and cannot coordinate their demand. Multiple equilibria exist between certain
levels of initial capital and the equilibrium depends on the coordination of demand.
In other words, there exists strategic complementarity in investment demands of final
producers in the presence of imperfect intermediation.
Instead of focusing on the role of financial intermediation in the presence of fixed costs
or investment indivisibility, the present paper investigates the effects of portfolio deci-
sions between productive capital investment and unproductive asset holdings in a fully
competitive setting without market restrictions or externalities. Given a concave pro-
1Saint-Paul (1992) assume that the cost of trading in financial market is less than proportional to the
volume traded whereas if technological diversification implies less productivity, its cost is proportional
to output. Multiple equilibria arise in the range where the cost of trading and the cost of technological
diversification are equal.
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duction function, two effects have to be considered to possibly explain the causes of
impediments to growth from equity. Firstly, the lower the capital stock the higher is the
return from capital. High returns attract funds for productive investment and induce a
convergence force. Secondly, if a market for unproductive equity investment is available
as an portfolio alternative, the risk adjusted return from an unproductive investment
might be higher than the return from the productive one. In this case, investors may
choose to make only unproductive investment. As a consequence, the capital stock is
pushed to a lower level by depreciation. If unproductive investment still remains more
attractive at the lower level of capital, then the capital stock will accumulate to low
(zero) levels, creating a so called poverty trap for an economy.
The model developed in this paper provides a detailed analysis of the endogenous in-
terplay of investment diversification between an equity market and a capital market
and economic performance. The standard overlapping generations model is extended to
include paper assets traded by consumers in addition to investment in real capital in
order to transfer wealth over time. Thus, agents hold unproductive assets not as in Ben-
civenga & Smith (1991) and Greenwood & Smith (1997) to insure themselves against
unpredictable liquidity needs, but simply to maximize expected future consumption un-
der rational expectations. In other words, asset holdings are motivated in the spirit
of the standard capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and not by the liquidity needs of
consumers a` la Diamond & Dybvig (1983). The asset market is modelled as in Bo¨hm &
Chiarella (2005) where asset prices are determined endogenously by the interaction of
heterogeneous consumers.
For the real side of the economy, it is assumed that capital accumulation occurs with ir-
reversible investment and depreciation. Factor prices are determined by their respective
marginal products, so that consumer income and the price of the paper asset becomes
endogenous. As a consequence, the returns in the asset market and in the capital market
are endogenous, making portfolio choices and capital accumulation depend on the two
rates of return and on disposable income of consumers. It is shown that for a Cobb-
Douglas production function there is a universal threshold value of the capital share in
production above which multiple equilibria with a poverty trap may occur depending
on the risk adjusted return on unproductive investment and the production technology.
Thus, there may be a spiralling effect on asset prices and their returns over the real
rate on capital leading to zero levels of capital and income while asset prices diverge
to infinity. The model here identifies a particular feed back mechanism between asset
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markets and real capital markets under perfect competition and rational expectations
as an important cause for the existence of a poverty trap, while all of the other sources
of a poverty trap as summarized in Matsuyama (2006) are missing.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and discusses some
of its properties. Section 3 derives the minimum state representative solution under
rational expectations. Section 4 analyzes the dynamics of the economy and Section 5
concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a market economy evolving in discrete time with consumption, production,
and capital accumulation. In each period a single commodity is produced from labor
and capital subject to a random productivity shock. The produced commodity can be
either consumed or invested irreversibly into capital. There is no inventory holding and
capital depreciates at a constant rate. In addition to the markets for output, labor, and
capital there is a market for retradeable assets which are issued as equity of a single
firm/producer. Consumers chose a portfolio consisting of real savings and of shares of the
firm. All markets operate under perfect competition implying that the respective agents
are price takers. There is neither strategic behavior nor any information asymmetry.
2.1 The Production Sector
For simplicity we assume that there is a single infinitely lived firm in the economy.
Its random technology can be decomposed into a deterministic part described by a
production function which is homogeneous of degree one in capital and labor plus a shock
to labor productivity. More specifically, production in per capita terms is described by a
standard (instantaneous) per capita production function f : R+ → R+ with an additive
shock ε,
y = f(k) + ε,
satisfying the following assumption.2
2In order to minimize notation, the index t will be suppressed as much as possible. Variables without
time subscript refer to an arbitrary period t while subscripts 1 and -1 refer to periods t + 1 and t − 1
respectively.
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Assumption 1 The technology of the firm is described by an isoelastic production func-
tion, f : R+ → R+, with scale parameter, A > 0, and elasticity parameter, θ ∈ [0, 1],
f(k) = Akθ.
Assumption 2 The random perturbation, ε, is an i. i. d. random variable distributed
according to the gamma distribution with parameters, (α, β) ∈ R2++, i.e., the distribution
function, F , is given by
F (x) :=
βα
Γ(α)
∫ x
0
yα−1e−βydy.
The firm pays wages and the rental rate on capital according to the marginal product
rule,
w(k) := f(k)− kf ′(k) and r(k) := f ′(k),
while the remaining random output is paid as dividends to the share holders of the
firm. Assumption 2 implies that the expected dividend and the variance of dividends
are given by Eε := µ = α
β
and Vε := σ2 = α
β2
respectively.
2.2 The Consumption Sector
The consumption sector in every period consists of overlapping generations of finitely
many consumers. Each generation lives for two periods and, for simplicity, we assume
that there is no population growth. The typical young agent of generation t supplies
one unit of labor inelastically to the labor market in the first period of his lifetime
and receives labor income w. His lifetime utility depends on old age consumption only.
He can transfer his wage income as wealth to the next period either by real savings
(investing directly into the firm) or by purchasing equity shares. Therefore, a young
agent faces the budget constraint
b+ xp ≤ w,
where b denotes the amount of real savings/real investment, and x is the number of equity
shares purchased at the price p. It is assumed that the young consumer can neither take
credit in the capital market nor can he take a short position in the asset market in
order to finance investment, implying b ≥ 0 and x ≥ 0. In the second period of his life
time, an agent receives the rate of return r1 on his productive investment. In addition,
he receives x(p1 + ε1) in consumption goods from selling his share holdings and as the
5
random dividend payment. Old agents do not leave any bequest to future generations
and consume their entire wealth. Therefore, final consumption c1 is restricted to final
wealth as
c1 ≤ br1 + x(p1 + ε1). (1)
The young agent’s objective is to maximize the expected utility of second period con-
sumption.
Assumption 3 Young agents’ preferences over the second period consumption are de-
scribed by the CARA utility function with risk aversion parameter a > 0, i. e.
u(c) = 1− e−ac.
When making the portfolio decision, next period’s rate of return and equity price, (r1, p1)
are unknown for young agents. It is assumed that agents make point forecasts (re, pe)
for both variables. In the subsequent analysis we will assume that agents will form
rational expectations, i. e. , agents expectation about these quantities always coincides
with actual realizations.
We assume that agents know the distribution function F and fully utilize this informa-
tion when making their portfolio choice. For given values of (p, w, pe, re) ≥ 0, the young
agent’s asset demand, ϕ(p, w, pe, re), is defined as
ϕ(p, w, pe, re) := arg max
x∈B(p,w)
∫
R+
u(c1)dF (ε1), (2)
where
c1 := r
ew + x(pe + ε1 − pre) (3)
is the random future consumption, while
B(p, w) = {x|x ≥ 0, xp ≤ w} (4)
is the young agent’s current budget constraint. As shown in Bo¨hm, Kikuchi & Vachadze
(2005), the demand for equity shares can be written as
ϕ(p, w, pe, re) =


0 if p ∈
[
pe + E(ε)
re
,∞
)
1
a
(
α
pre − pe − β
)
if p ∈
[
pe + χ(w, pe, re)
re
,
pe + E(ε)
re
)
w
p
if p ∈
(
0,
pe + χ(w, pe, re)
re
)
(5)
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where χ(w, pe, re) is the unique positive solution for p, of the following quadratic equation
αp = (βp+ aw) (pre − pe).
2.3 Temporary Equilibrium
Assume that firms do not issue new equity and that the total stock of equity is constant
over time and normalized to one. Given the demographic structure and the preferences
of consumers, it is clear that all assets are retraded in every period between young and
old consumers. In this case, temporary asset market equilibrium is defined by an asset
price, p, solving
ϕ(p, w(k), pe, re) = 1. (6)
For a given (k, pe, re), let p = S(k, pe, re) denote the solution of (6), i. e.
ϕ(S(k, pe, re), w(k), pe, re) = 1, for all (k, pe, re).
The mapping S : R3+ → R+ is usually referred to as the temporary equilibrium mapping
defining current prices as a function of current expectations for the future. It is a price
law in the sense of Bo¨hm & Wenzelburger (1999, 2002) with an expectations feedback.
The following proposition provides a full parametric characterization of this mapping.
Proposition 1 If Assumptions (2) and (3) are satisfied. Then, the price law is defined
by
p = S(k, pe, re) := min
(
w(k),
pe + pi
re
)
(7)
where pi = α
a+β
= µ
2
aσ2+µ
is the risk adjusted expected return on dividend.
Proof: Suppose pre ∈ (pe + χ(w, pe, re), pe + Eε) then the expression (5) implies that
the market clearing price should satisfy pre − pe = pi, where pi = α
a+β
. If pre ≤ pe +
χ(w, pe, re), the market clearing price is w(k). Since the equity price cannot exceed the
wage income the claim of proposition follows immediately. 
Finally, given a temporary equilibrium with an asset price, p = S(k, pe, re), aggregate
savings in assets is equal to S(k, pe, re), implying that, w(k) − S(k, pe, re), is equal to
investment in capital. Since investment is assumed to be irreversible, all non-depreciated
capital remains in the firm. Therefore, the equation describing capital accumulation is
given by
k1 = A(k, p) := (1− δ)k + w(k)− p. (8)
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The two mappings (7) and (8) define the temporary equilibrium (k, p) for any given
expected equity price and capital return of the next period. For a dynamic analysis, the
description of expectations formation has to be added.
3 Rational Expectations Equilibrium
Since the asset price map (7) contains expectations regarding the asset price and the rate
of return of the following period (a so called expectational lead), there exist two different
principles for stationary forecasting rules according to which rational expectations or
perfect foresight along a dynamic path may be obtained. The first principle relies only
on the past observations and utilizes them in order to obtain future predictions.
The second principle to obtain perfect foresight solutions (orbits) leads to the notion of
the so called minimum state variable solution (MSV). From a dynamical systems point
of view this corresponds to the associated functional rational expectations equilibrium3
discussed and used in the literature. The basic idea for an MSV for the model here is
straightforward. If the asset price p could be determined in any period as a function
of the level of capital alone and independent of expectations, the capital accumulation
equation implies an explicit perfect predictor for next period’s asset price and capital
return. Suppose that there exists such a price function p = P (k), determining prices
in any period as a function of the level of capital alone. Then the capital accumulation
function is given by
G(k) := A(k, P (k)) := (1− δ)k + w(k)− P (k).
Using the capital accumulation function G, one can derive a price predictor ψ and the
perfect predictor ρ for the return on capital by
ψ(k) := P (G(k)), and ρ(k) := r(G(k)) := f ′(G(k)).
In order for the same price predictor ψ to be perfect in every period, it must be consistent
with the price law for each capital level, i. e. the unknown function P must satisfy the
following functional equation
P (k) = S(k, P (G(k)), f ′(G(k))).
3see McCallum (1998, 1999) , Spear (1988), Bo¨hm & Wenzelburger (2004), Wenzelburger (2005)
8
Observe that in such a case, capital accumulation is one dimensional, and the predictors
ρ and ψ guarantee perfect foresight in every period along any orbit of the economy.
Based on the above arguments one obtains the following definition4.
Definition 1 The minimum state variable solution (MSV) is defined by a pair of price
and capital accumulation functions (P,G), P : R+ → R+ and G : R+ → R+ such that
for any k ≥ 0
(a) for a given capital accumulation function, G, the price function satisfies
P (k) = S(k, P (G(k)), r(G(k))) (9)
(b) for a given price function, P , the capital accumulation function satisfies
G(k) = (1− δ)k + w(k)− P (k). (10)
In the sequel, equations (9) and (10) will be referred to as the price and capital ac-
cumulation equations. In the next proposition we will construct a rational expecta-
tions equilibrium, i. e. by constructing an algorithm to approximate the functions of
the equilibrium price, P (.), and of the capital accumulation, G(.). Define the set,
K := {k|P (k) < w(k)}, where P (k) is the equilibrium price function. From Lemma
(2), it follows that for k outside the set K, the solution of the system (9) and (10) is
P (k) = w(k) and G(k) = (1− δ)k. Lemma (2) establishes bounds of the set K, i.e., for
given parameter values, we know the unique price and capital accumulation functions
outside the set K. The question remains a) whether there exists functions P and G
defined on K and satisfying equations (9) and (10) and b) how to approximate them.
The next proposition gives an answers to these questions.
Proposition 2 Consider the sequence of price and capital accumulation functions,
{Pn, Gn}∞n=1, defined on the set K as follows
(a) P0 = 0;
(b) k1 = Gn(k) solves the following equation
k1 + S(k, Pn−1(k1), r(k1)) = (1− δ)k + w(k); (11)
4see McCallum (1999) and Spear (1988)
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(c) Pn(k) is determined by
Pn(k) = S(k, Pn−1(Gn(k)), r(Gn(k))); (12)
then the sequence of {Pn, Gn}∞n=1 functions converges uniformly to the equilibrium price
and capital accumulation functions, {P,G};
(d) {P,G} functions are both continuous and monotonically increasing.
Proof: (see appendix) 
In the above proposition we established that the system of functional equations, (9) and
(10), has at least one continuous and monotonically increasing solution, which we can
approximate by forming a sequence of functions. In the next proposition we establish
that the solution of the system (9) and (10) is unique.
Proposition 3 The system of functional equations (9) and (10) has a unique continu-
ous solution.
Proof: (see appendix) 
It was shown above that the system of functional equations (9) and (10) has a unique
continuous solution. This solution implies some special properties for the G map and
consequently for the dynamics of the economy. In the next section we study the dynamics
of the economy for all possible parameter configuration.
4 Rational Expectations Dynamics
In spite of the fact that the explicit functional form of the price function cannot be
obtained, its implications for the time one map G can be determined which suffice to
characterize completely the dynamics of the economy. The crucial parameter is whether
the production elasticity θ is greater or less than, equal, or larger than one half. The
three cases will be discussed separately.
4.1 Steady States and Stability
Proposition 4 If θ < 0.5, then the dynamical system (R+, G) has a unique positive,
stable steady state.
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Proof: If θ < 0.5, Lemma (1) implies that there are two steady states. One of them is
zero and the other one is positive. G is a monotonically increasing function. In order to
show the claim of the this proposition, it is enough to show that G′(0) = ∞.
Let’s start by contradiction. Suppose G′(0) = a <∞. This implies,
lim
k→0
G(k)
k
= a⇒ lim
k→0
G(k)
w(k)
= 0 ⇒ lim
k→0
P (k)
w(k)
= lim
k→0
(1− δ)k + w(k)−G(k)
w(k)
= 1 ⇒
lim
k→0
P (k)
w(k)
= 1 ⇒ lim
k→0
P (G(k))+pi
Aθ
(G(k))1−θ
w(k)
≥ 1 ⇒ lim
k→0
pi
Aθ
(G(k))1−θ
w(k)
≥ 1.
This is a contradiction, because
lim
k→0
pi
Aθ
(G(k))1−θ
w(k)
= lim
k→0
pi
Aθ
(ak)1−θ
A(1− θ)kθ =
pia1−θ
A2θ(1− θ) limk→0 k
1−2θ = 0.
Therefore, G′(0) = ∞. 
Proposition 5 Suppose θ = 0.5, then the dynamical system (R+, G)
(a) has a unique positive, stable steady state if A2 > 4pi;
(b) has a unique stable zero steady state if A2 ≤ 4pi;
Proof: If A2 ≤ 4pi then the dynamical system (R+, G) has a unique steady state which
is stable. If A2 > 4pi then there are two steady states. In order to show that the zero
steady state is an unstable one we use the same logic as in Proposition (4).
G is an increasing function. Suppose G′(0) = a <∞. This implies,
lim
k→0
G(k)
k
= a and lim
k→0
G(k)√
k
= 0. (13)
The continuity of the price function P together with equation (13) implies
lim
k→0
P (k)√
k
= lim
k→0
2
P (G(k)) + pi
A
√
G(k)√
k
=
2pi
A
√
a. (14)
The capital accumulation equation can be rewritten as follows
G(k)√
k
+
P (k)√
k
= (1− δ)
√
k +
w(k)√
k
. (15)
Taking the limit of both sides of equation (15) as k → 0 and using equations (13) and
(14), we obtain that 2pi
A
√
a = A
2
. The last equation implies that G′(0) =
(
A2
4pi
)2
> 1,
which guarantees the instability of the zero steady state. 
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Proposition 6 Suppose θ > 0.5, then there exists a threshold value, A∗(θ, δ, pi), depend-
ing on which the dynamical system (R+, G) can have either one, or two stable steady
states.
(a) If A < A∗(θ, δ, pi) then there is a unique, stable, zero steady state;
(b) If A = A∗(θ, δ, pi) then there are two, zero and positive steady states; zero is a
stable, while the positive steady state is unstable;
(c) If A > A∗(θ, δ, pi) then there are three steady states. zero and the largest steady
states are stable and the intermediate steady state is unstable.
Proof: If there are one or two steady states then the graph of G is below the identity
line. This means that zero is the only stable steady state. If there are three steady
states then from Lemma (2) we know that G(0) = 0 and G′(0) = 1− δ, and the graph
of G crosses the identity line first from below (intermediate steady state) and then from
above (high steady state). This implies the stability of the large steady state and the
instability of the intermediate one. 
PSfrag replacementsG(k)
k
id
(1− δ)k
(a) A < A∗(θ, δ, pi)
PSfrag replacementsG(k)
k
id
(1− δ)k
(b) A = A∗(θ, δ, pi)
PSfrag replacementsG(k)
k
id
(1− δ)k
(c) A > A∗(θ, δ, pi)
Figure 1: Time one map G(k); θ > 0.5
Figure 1 displays all possible shapes of the map G, when θ > 0.5. When A is smaller
than the threshold level A∗(θ, δ, pi), (for definition see Lemma 1) there is a unique, stable,
zero steady state. If A = A∗(θ, δ, pi) there are two steady states and the zero steady
state is the stable one. If A > A∗(θ, δ, pi) there are three steady states with zero and the
highest steady state being stable.
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4.2 Comparative Dynamics
The analysis above shows that the capital share in production has a critical impact on
the dynamic path of the economy. The economy with an asset market converges to a
unique positive steady state whatever the initial capital stock of the economy is if θ < 0.5.
Thus, given a relatively high labor share in production, the economy accumulates enough
capital stock and consumers invest both in real capital and in equity in the steady state.
If θ = 0.5, however, the economy with an asset market converges to a positive steady
state only if A2 > 4pi otherwise it converges to zero. In other words, if the productivity
of the economy is relatively low compared to the risk adjusted expected dividend, it will
eventually be trapped in poverty for any initial capital stock.
If θ > 0.5, the economy with an asset market can only escape from the poverty trap
for sufficiently high production technology level and high initial capital stock. Even for
a high production technology level, multiple steady states arise with a low and a high
positive steady state. The low steady state is unstable and the economy converges to
zero if it’s initial capital stock is smaller than the low steady state, otherwise it converges
to the high steady state. In other words, the economy may still be trapped in poverty
if the initial capital stock is not sufficiently high even for sufficiently high production
technology level. The main reason for this poverty trap can be seen if we compare
the return from capital investment, r(k) = Aθkθ−1, with the risk adjusted return from
unproductive investment, R(k) = pi
A(1−θ)k
−θ. If θ > 0.5, for sufficiently low capital stock,
k, R(k) > r(k), for any A. Due to the higher risk adjusted return from unproductive
equity investment agents stop to invest in the productive technology. This leads to
the gradual deprecation of the existing capital stock. Thus, the poverty trap in the
economy with an asset market arises due to the existence of a market for unproductive
investment. The condition for escaping the poverty trap is a high production technology
level and a higher initial capital stock.
5 Summary and Conclusions
We have formulated a dynamic model of capital accumulation, with an asset market
and overlapping generations of consumers. Consumers live for two period, work in the
first period and consume in the second period only. Given their wage income, consumers
decide how much to invest in productive capital and unproductive assets. The minimum
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state variable solution of the economy is found to be a deterministic one dimensional
map, which is monotonically increasing. Thus, all rational expectations solutions are
monotonically converging to a steady state without cycles or random shocks.
The paper shows that the capital share in production plays a crucial role for the existence
of a poverty trap. Specifically, it is shown that there is a universal threshold level of the
capital share in production, equal to one half, below which a poverty trap never occurs.
Therefore, when the capital share in production is less than one half, the economy has
a unique stable positive steady state. This means no matter how underdeveloped the
economy is initially, it will converge to a unique steady state. It is shown in Bo¨hm,
Kikuchi & Vachadze (2005) that this steady steady is associated with a higher average
consumer welfare than in the steady state of an economy without the asset market.
Therefore, there is an incentive to open the market for an unproductive asset.
However, when the capital share in production is higher than one half, the economy
converges to the zero steady state unless it is equipped with a sufficiently high production
technology level and high initial capital stock. If the economy without a market for an
unproductive asset opens such a market, then the capital stock has to be above the lower
steady state value of the economy with the asset market in order to avoid convergence
to the zero steady state.
6 Appendix
Lemma 1 Let (P,G) is the solution of the system of functional equations (9) and (10).
Then the non-negative steady states of the G map can be classified as follows
• if θ < 0.5 then there are two steady states, with k∗1 = 0 and k∗2 > 0;
• if θ = 0.5 and
– A2 ≤ 4pi then there is a unique zero steady state;
– A2 > 4pi there are two steady states, with k∗1 = 0 and k
∗
2 > 0;
• if θ > 0.5 then there exists a threshold value A∗(θ, δ, pi), such that if
– A < A∗(θ, δ, pi) then there is a unique steady state with k∗1 = 0;
– A = A∗(θ, δ, pi) then there are two steady states, with k∗1 = 0 and k
∗
2 > 0;
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– A > A∗(θ, δ, pi) then there there are three steady states, with k∗1 = 0, k
∗
2 > 0
and k∗3 > 0;
In all steady states r(k) > 1.
Proof: Let k = G(k) be a steady state. Using this equilibrium condition in equations
(9) and (10) we obtain that the equilibrium price and the capital stock level, (p∗, k∗),
satisfy the following system of equations
p = w(k)− δk
p =
pi
r(k)− 1 .
(16)
It is clear that the pair (k∗, p∗) = (0, 0) satisfies the above system of equation for any θ.
By eliminating p from the system (16), we obtain the following equation with respect
to k.
(w(k)− δk)(r(k)− 1) = pi (17)
Substituting
w(k)
k
=
1− θ
θ
r(k), and k =
[
Aθ
r(k)
] 1
1−θ
.
into equation (17), the equilibrium interest rate should satisfy the following equation
ϕ(r) = φ(r), (18)
where
ϕ(r) =
(
1− θ
θ
r − δ
)
(r − 1) and φ(r) = pi
[Aθ]
1
1−θ
r
1
1−θ (19)
PSfrag replacements
ϕ(r), φ(r)
r
δ
θδ
1−θ 1
(a) θ < 0.5
PSfrag replacements
ϕ(r), φ(r)
r
δ
θδ
1−θ 1
(b) θ = 0.5
PSfrag replacements
ϕ(r), φ(r)
r
δ
θδ
1−θ 1
(c) θ > 0.5
Figure 2: All possible configurations of ϕ(r) and φ(r) functions
15
Figure 2 visualizes all possible configurations of the ϕ(r) and φ(r) functions. In partic-
ular if θ < 0.5, functions ϕ(r) and φ(r) functions cross each other only once at r > 1.5
If θ = 0.5, both functions ϕ(r) and φ(r) are quadratic and depending on their slopes at
r = 1, they can either cross only once or never at r > 1. c) If θ > 0.5, three different situ-
ations may occur. A solution of the equation ϕ(r) = φ(r) = 0, if it exists, determines the
equilibrium interest rate r∗(A, θ, δ, pi). If in addition, ϕ′(r∗(A, θ, δ, pi)) = φ′(r∗(A, θ, δ, pi))
holds, the solution determines a critical level A∗(θ, δ, pi) for which ϕ(r) and φ(r) are
tangent to each other. Since φ(r) is decreasing with respect to A, it follows that for
A < A∗(θ, δ, pi) there is no solution of equation (18) and for A > A∗(θ, δ, pi) there are
two solutions (see Figure 2(c)). 
Lemma 2 Let us define the set K = {k|P (k) < w(k)}, where P (k) solves the system of
functional equations (9) and (10) then
a) if θ < 0.5 then K = [0, (1 − δ)k̂2) where k̂2 is the unique solution of the following
nonlinear equation
A(1− θ)(1− δ)θkθ = A
2θ(1− θ)
(1− δ)1−θ k
2θ−1 − pi; (20)
b) if θ = 0.5 and A2 > 4pi
√
1− δ then K = [0, (1− δ)k̂2), where k̂2 =
(
A2−4pi√1−δ
2A
√
1−δ
)2
;
c) if θ = 0.5 and A2 ≤ 4pi√1− δ then K = ∅;
e) if θ > 0.5 then K =
(
k̂1, (1− δ)k̂2
)
, where 0 < k̂1 < k̂2 < ∞ are solutions of the
equation (20);
Proof: Suppose P (k) = w(k) and P (G(k)) = w(G(k)). Then the capital accumulation
equation implies that, G(k) = (1− δ)k, and the price equation implies that
P (G(k)) + pi
Aθ
[G(k)]1−θ ≥ w(k). (21)
Equation (21) can be rewritten as
A(1− θ)(1− δ)θkθ + pi ≥ A
2θ(1− θ)
(1− δ)1−θ k
2θ−1. (22)
Graphical analysis of the functions given in equation (22) implies the claim of the lemma.

5We are not interested with equilibrium in which r < 1, because in such equilibrium asset price is
negative.
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Lemma 3 Suppose fn−1 ≤ fn and fn(x) is monotonically increasing function. If x +
fn−1(x) = y + fn(y) then x ≥ y.
Proof: Let us start by contradiction, suppose y > x then we have
0 < y − x = fn−1(x)− fn(y) < fn−1(x)− fn(x) ≤ 0, (23)
which is a contradiction, i.e., x ≥ y. 
Lemma 4 Let us consider a sequence of functions {Pn, Gn}∞n=1 defined in equations
(11) and (12). Then
a) {Pn, Gn}∞n=1 is a monotonic sequence of functions, in particular, 0 ≤ P1 ≤ P2 ≤ ...
and G1 ≥ G2 ≥ ... ≥ 0;
b) Pn(k) and Gn(k) are continuous, and monotonically increasing functions with respect
to k, for each n ∈ N;
Proof: We use the induction argument. Firstly we show that claims (a) and (b) are
correct for n = 1 and then by assuming that both claims are correct for arbitrary n, we
show that they are also correct for n + 1. By construction G1(k) solves the following
equation
x+ S(k, 0, r(x)) = (1− δ)k + w(k) (24)
Using the continuity and the monotonicity property of the price law, from equation (24)
it follows that G1(k) is positive, continuous and monotonically increasing function with
respect to k. From the relation, P1(k) = S(k, 0, r(G1(k))), we get that P1(k) is also
positive, continuous and monotonically increasing function.
Now let us assume that claims (a) and (b) are correct for an arbitrary n. By construction
Gn(k) and Gn+1(k) solve the following equations
x+ S(k, Pn−1(x), r(x)) = (1− δ)k + w(k) (25)
y + S(k, Pn(y), r(y)) = (1− δ)k + w(k). (26)
Since Pn−1 ≤ Pn and the price law is a monotonic transformation of the price function
it follows that for any given k, fn−1 ≤ fn, where fn−1(x) = S(k, Pn−1(x), r(x)) and
fn(y) = S(k, Pn(y), r(y)). In addition monotonicity of Pn(y) implies the monotonicity
of fn(y). Now we can apply Lemma (3) in order to get that Gn ≥ Gn+1. The last
inequality with the following equations
Pn(k) = S(k, Pn−1(Gn(k)), r(Gn(k))) (27)
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Pn+1(k) = S(k, Pn(Gn+1(k)), r(Gn+1(k))) (28)
implies that Pn ≤ Pn+1. This concludes the proof of claim (a). By applying the implicit
function theorem and using the property of the price law it follows that the solution
of equation (26) is a continuous and monotonically increasing function. From equation
(28) follows the continuity and the monotonicity of Pn+1(k) function. 
6.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Lemma (4) implies a point wise convergence of the sequence, {Pn(k), Gn(k)}∞n=1. By
contraction of this sequence it follows that
‖P − P0‖ = sup
k∈K
|P (k)− P0(k)| = sup
k∈K
|P (k)| < sup
k∈K
|w(k)| = M <∞. (29)
Price equation with Lemma (4) implies that
0 < P (k)− P1(k) = P (G(k)) + pi
r(G(k))
− P0(G1(k)) + pi
r(G1(k))
≤ P (G(k))− P0(G(k))
r(G(k))
. (30)
Equation (30) implies that
0 < P (k)− Pn(k) ≤ P (G(k))− Pn−1(G(k))
r(G(k))
≤ ... ≤ P (G
n(k))− P0(Gn(k))
r(G(k))r(G2(k))...r(Gn(k))
. (31)
Since we know that in steady state r(k) > 1, it follows that for any k ∈ K and for
sufficiently large n, r(G(k))r(G2(k))...r(Gn(k)) > 1 and consequently from (31) it follows
that
‖P − Pn‖ = sup
k∈K
|P (k)− Pn(k)| ≤ βnM, (32)
where
βn = sup
k∈K
1
r(G(k))r(G2(k))...r(Gn(k))
, (33)
and limn→∞ βn = 0.
Equations (32) and (33) imply the uniform convergence of the Pn series. Uniform con-
vergence of Pn implies the uniform convergence in Gn series and subsequently continuity
and monotonicity of solution (P,G). 
6.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose there are two different continuous equilibrium maps P1, G1 and P2, G2. Then,
there exists at least one k such that P1(k) 6= P2(k). Let us assume without loss of gener-
ality that P1(k) > P2(k). This inequality implies that G1(k) < G2(k) and consequently
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the following inequality should be satisfied
P1(G1(k)) + pi
Aθ
[G1(k)]
1−θ >
P2(G2(k)) + pi
Aθ
[G2(k)]
1−θ. (34)
Inequality (34) implies that P1(G1(k)) > P2(G2(k)), from which it follows that G
2
1(k) <
G22(k). Continuing this process we obtain that for any n ∈ N,
P (Gn1 (k)) > P (G
n
2 (k)) and G
n
1 (k) < G
n
2 (k). (35)
Gi map, for i = 1, 2 can have two stable fixed points either 0 or k̂ > 0. We consider
three cases, either 1) limn→∞Gn1 (k) = limn→∞G
n
2 (k) = 0; 2) limn→∞G
n
1 (k) = 0 and
limn→∞Gn2 (k) = k̂, or 3) limn→∞G
n
1 (k) = limn→∞G
n
2 (k) = k̂.
1) If limn→∞Gn1 (k) = limn→∞G
n
2 (k) = 0, then there exists a constant, N > 1, such that
Gn1 (k) = (1− δ)Gn−11 (k), and Gn2 (k) = (1− δ)Gn−12 (k) for n > N . This implies that the
price function is the wage function which contradicts the inequalities in (35).
2) If limn→∞Gn1 (k) = 0 and limn→∞G
n
2 (k) = k̂2, this leads to a contradiction because
0 = P1(0) = lim
n→∞
P1(G
n
1 (k)) ≥ lim
n→∞
P2(G
n
2 (k)) = P2(k̂) > 0. (36)
3) If limn→∞Gn1 (k) = limn→∞G
n
2 (k) = k̂2, then for sufficiently large n, P1(G
n
1 (k)) and
P2(G
n
2 (k)) can be expressed as
P1(G
n
1 (k)) =
pi
Aθ
[Gn1 (k)]
1−θ +
pi
A2θ2
[Gn1 (k)G
n+1
1 (k)]
1−θ + ... (37)
P2(G
n
2 (k)) =
pi
Aθ
[Gn2 (k)]
1−θ +
pi
A2θ2
[Gn2 (k)G
n+1
2 (k)]
1−θ + ... (38)
Equations (37) and (38) are in contradiction with the inequalities given in (35).

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